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RECENT DECISIONS

Appeal - The Appealability of an Order Overruling a Demurrer
Ore Tenus-The plaintiff's complaint alleged substantially the
following facts: The plaintiff was duly elected, qualified, and sworn as
judge of the Mayor's Court of Pilot Mountain Township. He continued
to hold office and faithfully perform his duties until the Mayor of the
Township and its Board of Commissioners attempted to remove him
from office after an administrative hearing. Plaintiff prayed for an
order restraining the defendant Mayor and Board from interfering with
the plaintiff's performance of his duties on the grounds that the Mayor
and Board had no such authority, and that the plaintiff could be replaced only after an election under the statute creating the Mayor's
Court. The plaintiff further contended that, under the North Carolina
Constitution, he could be removed from judicial office only by a twothirds vote of the state's General Assembly. At the trial, the defendant
demurred to the complaint ore tenus on the ground that the plaintiff
was merely an officer of the township and, under the township charter,
could be removed by the Mayor and Board, and that therefore the
plaintiff's complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. The trial court entered an order overruling the demurrer, the
defendant excepted, and an appeal was taken. Held, in affirming the
order, that, although an appeal will not ordinarily lie from an order
overruling a demurrer ore tenus, the case involved a matter of public
interest, and the court deemed it expedient to entertain the appeal.
Reid v. Mayor and Board of Commissioners of the Town of Pilot
Mountain, 241 N.C. 551, 85 S.E.(2d) 872 (1955).
For the purpose of a temporary working definition, a demurrer
ore tenus may be simply described as an oral demurrer. This type of
pleading was originally recognized in both the common law courts and
courts of equity. At common law, all pleadings were orally made. The
parties to an action would meet before the court and orally argue their
pleadings until a final issue of law or fact had been reached. Under this
procedure it was possible to orally demur to the sufficiency of the complaint as stating a cause of action.'
A similar practice arose in courts of equity. In Chancery, if a
formal demurrer to the complaint had been filed upon stated causes and
such causes were overruled, it was possible to present an oral demurrer
on other causes. 2 Thus it was possible in equity to orally challenge the
sufficiency of the complaint although it was necessary to first file a
formal demurrer.
A practice similar to the demurrer ore tenus of the English courts
arose early in Wisconsin law. The first case in which the Wisconsin
court recomnized such a demurrer was the case of Hays v. Lewis.3 In
1
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that case, the plaintiff asked foreclosure of a mortgage given to secure
a bond, but made no allegations as to the plaintiff's ownership of the
bond. The defendant objected at the trial to the introduction of any
evidence under the complaint on the grounds that the complaint did not
contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The objection was
overruled and judgment was reversed, the court stating that the defendant's oral objection was equivalent to a general demurrer and
should have been sustained since the complaint was fatally defective.
This decision was presumably based upon what is now Section
263.12 of the WISCONSIN STATUTES, but which first appeared in Wisconsin law in 1856.4 The section now appears as follows:
"If not interposed by demurrer or answer, the defendant waives
the objections to the complaint except the objection to the jurisdiction of the court and the objection that the complaint does not
state a cause of action." 5
The Wisconsin court continued to recognize the objection to evidence as a demurrer ore tenus with the one qualification that the complaint was to be more liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff if a
demurrer ore tenus had been interposed. 6
The Wisconsin court decided that other grounds than jurisdiction
and want of a cause of action could not be used to support a demurrer
ore tenus in the case of Murray v. McGarigle.7 In that case the defendant was not allowed to attack the plaintiff's capacity to sue by
means of a demurrer ore tenus.
In 1954, the Wisconsin Supreme Court changed the statute in formulating its rules to read as follows:
"If not interposed by demurrer or answer, the defendant waives
the objections to the complaint except the objection to the jurisdiction of the court but such waiver shall not preclude any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a cause of
action.""
Therefore, the present status of the demurrer ore tenus in Wisconsin seems to be that an objection to the introduction of any evidence
under a complaint is allowed on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction. This objection must be made immediately after the first witness
is sworn. a It is possible, however, to make such an objection equivalent
to a general demurrer by stipulation of the parties to the action.0 The

want of formal pleading may always be waived by stipulation.4

WIscoNsIN ANNOTATIONS, (1950) p. 1067.
STATS. (1953), §263.12.
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7 Murray v. McGarigle, 69 Wis. 483, 34 N.W. 522 (1887).
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9 Smith v. Kibling, 97 Wis. 205, 72 N.W. 869 (1897).
10 Ibid.
"IState ex rel Briesen v. Borden, 77 Wis. 601, 46 N.W. 899 (1890).
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The appealability of an order sustaining a demurrer ore tenus has
been well settled by four Wisconsin cases. There seems to have been
some confusion on this issue perhaps created by the fact that, although
a demurrer ore tenus is actually merely an objection to the introduction
of evidence, the historical naming of the practice as a demurrer has led
some to believe an order sustaining or overruling the objection is directly appealable in the same manner as an order in relation to a general
or special demurrer which is made an appealable order by statute.' 2 The
question first arose in the case of Smith v.Kibling." In that case, the
defendant answered the complaint and included a demurrer in his
answer. The plaintiff moved to make the answer more definite and certain. During the hearing of that motion, the defendant orally challenged the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action. The
trial court issued an order sustaining a demurrer, and the plaintiff appealed. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that the demurrer ore
tenus was merely an objection to the evidence, being called a demurrer
only for convenience. Such being the case, the court stated that the
ruling on such an objection must be preserved in a bill of exceptions
and considered only on an appeal from the judgment of a trial court.
The next case to arise was Mandelert v. Superior Consolidated
Land Company.' 4 In that case the plaintiff orally objected to the defendant's offer to prove the facts alleged in its answer. The trial court
issued a written order sustaining a demurrer to the answer, and the
defendant appealed. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that,
although the trial court order was in written form, it was merely a
ruling on an objection and had to be preserved by a bill of exceptions
and considered on an appeal from the judgment.
In the case of Town of Iron River v. Bayfield County, 5 the Wisconsin court again declared that a written order sustaining a demurrer
ore tenus was merely a ruling on an objection and could be considered
only on an appeal from the judgment.
The latest Wisconsin case on the matter is that of Plankington
Building Properties v. Hurley-Reilly Company.'6 In that case, the
plaintiff brought an unlawful detainer action in the Civil Court of Milwaukee County. The defendent answered, and when the cause came to
hearing, the defendant demurred ore tenus on the grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction and the complaint failed to state a cause of
action. The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff's case was dis32 WIs.
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'3 Supra, Note 9.
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missed. The plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court which reversed the
order of the Civil Court and overruled the demurrer. The defendant
than appealed to the Supreme Court. In dismissing the appeal, the
court held that the order was not an order relating to a formal demurrer
and therefore not directly appealable. The court also held that the Civil
Court's order was not a judgment and could not be appealed to the Circuit Court. The entire case was thus remanded to the Civil Court.
The decision of the North Carolina court in the principal case was
undoubtedly based upon the public interest involved in the fact situation.
This is strikingly illustrated by a case coming down from the same
court on the same day in which an appeal from a demurrer ore tenus
7
was summarily dismissed.'
It would seem highly unlikely that the Wisconsin court would take
the position of the North Carolina court even in a case of great public
interest based upon a consideration of the four Wisconsin cases cited
supra.'5 In each case the court definitely states that, in order to be
appealable, an order must fall within the express provisions of the
statutes. The definite and continued stand of the Wisconsin court as to
the inviolability of the statute in determining what orders are appealable
is illustrated by the case of Pick Industries v. Gebhard-Berghammer
Co.,'" where the court denied an appeal from an order denying a motion
to vacate an award stating:
"We see no occasion for additional appeal rights, and since the
statute has not provided for them, we do not consider it within
our province to make additions to the statute."
The proper practice for the Wisconsin attorney confronted by an
adverse ruling on a demurrer ore tenus would seem to be to accept the
suggestion of the Wisconsin cases on the subject, 20 by standing on the
complaint after the ruling, allowing a judgment to be entered, and appealing directly from the judgment.
ALLAN W. LEISER

17
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20 Supra, Notes 13-16.

